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Raisins and Resilience: Elaborating Home's
Compensation Analysis with an Eye to
Coastal Climate Change Adaptation
Joshua Ulan Galperin*
The State of New Jersey, the Borough of Harvey Cedars, and the United
States Army Corps of Engineers were all preparing for an event like
Hurricane Sandy years before the 2012 super-storm made landfall along the
Mid-Atlantic coast. ' The governments began, for instance, a major dune
restoration project in 2005 in order to protect the New Jersey coast from
massive storm surges that could destroy homes and businesses. 2 To carry out
the effort, the local governments ought to purchase the right to build along
the seaward portion of property owners' land, and would then construct
roughly twenty-foot-high, thirty-foot-wide dunes.3 If the government and the
landowner could not agree on a price or the landowner refused to sell, the
government would acquire the necessary strip of property using eminent
domain: the right of government o take private property for public use as
long as it offers just compensation. 4
This Article is about the proper way to calculate just compensation
when government partially takes private property for a use that provides a
degree of benefit to the remaining property.
* Clinical Director and Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School, lecturer and Environmental
Law and Policy Program Director at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental
Studies. I would like to first thank Connie Vogelmann, who helped me with the early
research for this article in 2013, even before I knew what I was going to write about.
Thanks to Doug Kysar, Zaheer Tajani, and Chris Halfnight for their critical assistance on
later versions, when I just barely knew what I was writing about. Thanks to Lauren Tarpey
and the staff of the Stanford Environmental Law Journal for making sure that the rest of
the world would understand what I wrote about. Thanks also to my wife Sara Kuebbing, a
better and more prolific academic than I. I am proud that at roughly 20,000 words, this
short article is only 5,000 words shorter than Sara's entire academic canon of 20 articles.
1. See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 527 (N.J. 2013).
2. Id. at 527.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 528.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Importance of Climate Change Resilience and the Option of
Eminent Domain
Coastal climate change adaptation strategies like those in New
Jersey, which assess and then respond to all types of climate
vulnerabilities, are critical. The United States coasts are home to
more than 164 million people, more than 50% of the country's
population.5 These areas support "66 million jobs and $3.4 trillion
5. Susanne C. Moser et al., Ch. 25: Coastal Zone Developmennt and JEcn.ysleni5, in CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, 579,
581 (U.S. Global Change Research Program ed., May 2014),
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in wages."' 6 In the aggregate, coastal communities "generate 58%
of the national gross domestic product"7 and contribute $6.7
trillion to the United States economy.8 But this concentration of
people, jobs, wealth, and economic energy is threatened by climate
change.
The risk is particularly acute given historical development
patterns. Shoreline developments have "frequently occurred
without adequate regard for coastal hazards."9 Sea levels rose at an
average of 1.7 millimeters per year through the 20th century, and
this rate seems to be accelerating.10 Other studies estimate "global
sea levels rose approximately eight inches [203 millimeters],
despite stable levels over the previous two millennia."'" Some
research estimates that global sea levels could rise by a meter or
more over the next hundred years.'2 And sea level rise is likely to
continue for many centuries.13
This threat has not escaped public notice. Sea level rise has
resulted in a "national conversation about what coastal
developments should be permitted and how they should be
built.' 14 There have been various attempts to chronicle local,
regional, and national adaptation activities.'5 "Hard" protections,
such as sea walls, can exacerbate erosion and coast loss, resulting
in "negative effects on coastal ecosystems, undermining the
attractiveness of beach tourism."'6 Alternatively, "soft" coastal
http://nca2l4.globalchange.gov/system/files- force/downloads/high/NCA3-Climate-C
hangeImpactsjin the-United%20States_ HighRes.pdf.
6. Jd. at 589
7. Id.at581.
8. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. OFFICE OF OCEAN & COASTAL RES. MGMT,
ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A PLANNING GUIDE FOR STATE COASTAL MANAGERS 5
(2010), https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/_/pdf/adaptationguide.pdf.
9. Moser et al., supra note 5, at 589.
10. See, e.g., Robert J. Nicholls et al., Ch. 6: Coavtal Systems and Lo-lying Areas, in
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE:
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, 317, 317 (2007),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter6.pdf.
11. Lara D. Guercio, Climate Change Adaptation and Coastal Property Rights: A
Massachumstts Case Stly, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 349, 355 (2013) (alteration in
original).
12. E.g., id. at 356.
13. Nicholls et al., snuna note 10, at 317.
14. Edna Sussman et al., Climate Change Adaptation: Fostering Piogress Through Law and
Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENWTL. L.J. 55, 70-71 (2010).
15. See, e.g., Moser et al., supra note 5, at 678.
16. Id. at 589.
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adaptation strategies, such as dune renourishment, are less
expensive but still effective, which helps explain why they are the
most common method of coastline protection in the United
States.'7 "Soft" adaptation "is commonly employed along ocean
shores-generally at public expense."18 In some cases dunes and
other soft projects might not intrude on private property. In most
cases, however, coastal adaptation projects will require government
possession of strips of private property on the seaward edge of
coastal lots, which may require the use of eminent domain.1 9
Despite the clear and present threat of climate change-or, at
the very least, intense and destructive coastal storms-there is
perhaps a feeling among some coastal residents that it is not
climate change, but government-driven coastal resilience projects,
that are the real threat to their property.
Naturally, government adaptation programs have spawned
litigation, from Washington to Texas to Florida to New Jersey. The
litigation addresses coastal sewage systems, integration of
adaptation into utility development plans, nutrient concerns in
changing water conditions, and insurance considerations, to name
a few.20 In New Jersey alone, the Department of Environmental
Protection estimates needing 4,200 easements for public projects
along the coast, and, though it has acquired all but 366, 239
owners refuse to sell the needed portion of their property.21
However, constitutional protection of private property is not
absolute. The government may take private property, through
eminent domain, to serve the public good as long as the
government also offers the property owner just compensation.22
Accordingly, one must ask: what is 'just" in the case of a partial
17. T.J. Campbell & L. Benedet, Beach Nouri hsiment Magnitudes and Trends in the U.S.,
SI 39J. OF COASTAL RESEARCH (SPECIAL ISSUE) 57, 63 (2006), available at http://www.cerf-
jcr.org/images/stories/09_tom.pdf.
18. James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: liow to Save
Wetlands and Beaches Without thrtinglrapery zowners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1308 (1998).
19. See, eg., Property Owneis Throw Cold Water on N.J. Share Piotective Dunes Plan, W. VA.
PUB. BROADCASTING (May 26, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://wvpublic.org/post/property-owners-
throw-cold-water-nj-shore-protective-dunes-plan.
20. Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Sue to Adapt?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2177, 2192
(2015).
21. KeNin McArdle, Want Dunes to Protect the Slime? Nenw Jersey Facing Down 239
'lardcore' lloldouts, N.J.101.5 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://nj1015.com/want-dunes-to-protect-the-
sho re-nj-facing-down-240-hardcore-holdouts/.
22. Eg., Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ("The power of
eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent state.").
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taking, where the government takes part of a property, but leaves a
"remainder" in private hands? How much should the government
compensate for the taken portion? How does the government
account for damages to the remaining portion? What do they do
when the remaining portion benefits from the taking? What is just
when a coastal resilience project takes a small portion of property
to construct a dune, and the dune blocks a beautiful ocean view
but also saves a beachfront home from complete destruction at the
hands of an enormous storm? This was the issue the New Jersey
Supreme Court faced in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.23 The
New Jersey court issued a sound and comprehensive answer,
focusing on market value of the remainder, which is a model for
other courts.
B. Judicial Convolution
The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, lacks a
clear rule for this benefit-offset problem.24 The Court's 2015 case
Home v. Department of Agriculture revolved around raisin farmers
who, by federal regulation, were required to turn a portion of their
crop over to the federal government in order to lower supply and
raise raisin prices nationwide.25 When debating the correct
method for setting compensation, justices were misdirected by
their complex precedent and poorly defined standards. Home
demonstrates that the Court has been bogged down in jargon
related to the scope of benefits, including whether they are
"general" or "special"26 and how to account for those benefits that
accrue to the general public, the whole neighborhood, or just to a
single landowner, for example.27 This is not the correct framework
for dealing with the benefit-offset problem, and it can lead courts
to set unjust compensation that ignores real benefits that impact a
property's market value.
Because adaptation projects protect private property, they
often lead to landowner benefits. Therefore, coastal governments
need articulate guidance from the Court in order to implement
appropriate adaptation measures. This Article argues that the
23. 70 A.3d 524 (NJ. 2013).
24. The phrase "benefit-offset problem" is borrowed from William Fischel. See
WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW, ECONOMICS, POLITICS (1998).
25. Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015).
26. id at 2432.
27. I. at 24 3 4-3 5 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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United States Supreme Court should move beyond the
impenetrable nomenclature that it has used for more than a
century to assess compensation in cases of so-called "partial
takings," and should instead adopt a simple rule, setting
compensation that accounts for the market value of the
remainder, and reducing compensation by any calculable and
certain increase in that value.
As governments more frequently acquire private property in
coastal resilience efforts, often through eminent domain, courts
will need to confront this partial-takings issue head on. Therefore,
this Article seeks to coalesce a doctrine that can address the
benefit-offset problem. While fair market value is the standard
measure of just compensation, in an effort to solve the problem,
some courts have created a dichotomy of "special" and "general"
benefits-those that are unique to a single property versus those
that apply to all properties in the area. But this dichotomy is
unhelpful and courts have misapplied their own distinction or
simply treated it as a post hoc justification rather than analytical
tool.28 As this Article explains, the distinction is subjective, has no
basis in the Constitution, and, ultimately, is not a good solution to
the benefit-offset problem
C. A Proposed Solution
This Article also seeks to rectify apparent discrepancies among
leading cases that address the benefit-offset problem. In over a
century of case law, courts have sometimes used benefits to offset
compensation and other times have refused. This Article argues
that the consistent analytical rule applied in all these cases is not
the special-general distinction, that is, the breadth of the benefit,
but rather whether the benefit has a certain and presently
calculable impact on the market value of the property. If the
impact is certain and calculable, then courts must offset the
increase against compensation.
The following Section offers a primer on takings law. Section
III goes on to discuss the scope of the benefit-offset problem by
focusing on the antiquated and unhelpful distinction between
"special" and "general" benefits. Section IV reviews Supreme
Court doctrine around benefit calculations and concludes that the
Court has implicitly used a fair market value analysis even when it
28. See ifra Section IV.B.
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claims to use a special-general benefit rule. Section V analyzes the
NewJersey Supreme Court's decision in Harvey Cedars v. Karan and
offers it as a sound and eloquent statement of the rule that the
United States Supreme Court should adopt to set compensation
for partial takings. Section VI revisits Home and describes how the
Chief Justice's misinterpretation of the Court's precedent
nevertheless resulted in the correct disposition. Section VII seeks
to articulate a constitutionally sound and practically administrable
doctrine that rectifies Home with the existing precedent.
II. A VERY BRIEF PRIMER ON TAKINGS LAW
It is important briefly to cover the concept of takings before
exploring the benefit-offset problem and the nuances of just
compensation.
The government can take private property, whether directly
through the power of eminent domain,29 or whether inadvertently,
through a regulatory program.30 The Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, however, places certain limitations on
that allowance.3 1 First, the Takings Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment explicitly requires that the government can only take
property for "public use."3 Generally speaking, any purpose that
promotes the public health, safety, welfare, or morals is a valid
public use.33 Thus, while a government "may not take the property
of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party
B," "a [s]tate may transfer property from one private party to
another if future use by the public is the purpose of the taking" or
if the purpose of the transfer is broad economic development. 34
The second limitation on the government's power to take
29. E.g., Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ("The power of
eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent state.").
30. E.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
withoutjust compensation.").
32. Id; see also, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (noting
that the Fifth Amendment only allows takings for public use); 26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent
Domtain § 3 (2015) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment is not a prohibition on
interfering with property, but a constraint on government actions by requiring that
eminent domain is only used for a public use).
33. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 481 (2005) ("It is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." (quoting Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954))).
34. Id at 477-79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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private property is that the government must give the property
owner (or prior property owner, as the case may be) "just
compensation."3 5 Determining what amount of compensation is
just is the responsibility of the judicial branch.3 6 The remainder of
this Article addresses one aspect of judicial calculation of just
compensation. But, in broad terms, the constitutional guarantee of
just compensation assures that the government will put the
property owner "in the same position monetarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken."37 At the same time,
the courts must assure that compensation is not only just to the
individual whose property was taken, but also to the public at
large.38 After all, it is the public, through their tax dollars, that
foots the compensation bill. To best balance these two competing
components of just compensation, the Supreme Court has
frequently held that the market value of property at the time of the
taking is the best measure for compensation.
39
This Article focuses on when and how courts deviate from the
market value rule to account for any benefits to the remaining
property that an owner may reap from a government project or
regulation, and whether a distinction between general and special
benefits should be part of that accounting.
III. GENERAL VERSUS SPECIAL BENEFITS
Because the government can only take property for the
purposes of public use, it is natural that whenever the government
takes property, there will be some resulting benefit to the owner or
former owner. The quantity and quality of that benefit, however,
can vary dramatically. The distinction between "general" and
"special" benefits arises from this inevitable reality.40
35. E.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,
473 (1973); 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.01 (3d ed. 2015).
36. Eg., United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923) ("The
ascertainment of compensation is a judicial function, and no power exists in any other
department of government to declare what the compensation shall be or to prescribe any
binding rule in that regard." (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312 (1893))); 2 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES § 683 (3d ed. 1909); 3 NICHOLS, supna note 35, § 8.21.
37. Almota Fartnets, 409 U.S. at 474 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 379 U.S. 14,
16(1970)).
38. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); Searl v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S.
553, 562 (1890).
39. Almoa Plamers, 409 U.S. at 474 (citing New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915)).
40. E.g., Banman, 167 U.S. at 562; E.H. Schopflocher, Annotation, Deduclion ofBe-efis
[Vol. 35:1
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Unfortunately, the exact definitions of "general" and "special" are
quite unclear,4' and reliance on this distinction can lead to unjust
calculations of compensation. Although this Article argues that
courts should dispose of the general-special dichotomy, it is
necessary to have a working explanation of the terms in order to
understand the problems that they cause.
When the government effects a partial taking, a general benefit
is a benefit to the remaining property that is similar to the benefits
that other properties in the area will receive from the project or
regulatory scheme.42 By some definitions, a benefit that is
uncertain, speculative, or unquantifiable is also a general benefit.
43
Conversely, a special benefit is a benefit that is unique to the
targeted property, does not apply to other properties, and in some
applications, is reasonably certain to occur and reasonably
calculable.
44
Highway construction serves as an excellent example of both
general and special benefits. Imagine that the state department of
transportation (DOT) uses eminent domain to build a new
highway across a farmer's land. In calculating just compensation,
the DOT may argue that the highway will provide faster access to
the nearest town. Under the standard definition of the special-
general distinction, which focuses on the breath of the benefit,
quicker highway access is a general benefit. To begin with, the
farmer and her neighbors will now all have quicker highway access.
This is not unique to the farmer's property. Although the farmer
may live immediately next to the new onramp and therefore have
the greatest benefit in terms of access, her neighbors will receive
the same kind of benefit even if they do not receive exactly the
same quantity of benefit. That is, the entire area will have quicker
access even if the degree of that benefit varies somewhat based on
proximity to the new highway and ramp.
In some cases, courts use the term "general benefits" to
describe benefits that are uncertain or unquantifiable. With
respect to this speculation-oriented definition, consider the
following example. DOT might argue that the highway case will
in Determining Compensation or Damages in Eminent Domain, 145 A.L.R. FED. 7 (1945).
41. E.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 536 (NJ. 2013).
42. 3 NICHOLS, supra note 35, § 8A.02.
43. Eg., Mangles v. Hudson Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 25 A. 322, 323 (N.J,
1892).
44. 3 NICHOLS, suna note 35, § 8A.02.
2016J
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bring new people into the town and increase traffic through local
business districts, which could result in greater property values.
DOT may well be correct in its prediction. Nevertheless, this
benefit is speculative because there is hardly certainty that more
traffic will increase property values. Moreover, even if DOT's
prediction is accurate, assessing a potential future increase in
property values resulting from more traffic is not easily susceptible
to present calculation.
The same example can be used to illustrate a special benefit.
Suppose that to construct the highway DOT will drain an
inundated portion of the farmer's land. When it drains the
wetlands, the farmer will have more arable land and can grow
more crops. This benefit is unique to the farmer's property. While
the entire community benefits from the highway generally, only
the farmer will have new cropland available and this benefit would
therefore fall under the standard definition of "special benefit."
With respect to the speculation-oriented definition, there is no
speculation needed to recognize the individualized advantage
here: when DOT drains the land, it will be available for planting
without respect to contingencies such as highway usage or the
effect of highway usage on the local economy. Moreover, while it
may not be easy to calculate the value of the new cropland, it is
certainly quantifiable in a way that benefits from new traffic are
not.
The distinction between general and special benefits is critical
because many courts will offset special benefits when calculating
just compensation but will not offset general benefits.45 The
distinction between the types of benefits and the distinct
approaches that different courts take, while susceptible to
manipulation and confusion, do have a logical basis. Just
compensation must be "just" to both the property owner and the
public.46 Therefore, the rationale for subtracting special benefits
from compensation is to prevent a property owner from receiving
a windfall that would put her in a better place than she was in
45. E.g., Schopflocher, supra note 40, at Part V.a.
46. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) ("The just compensation required by
the constitution to be made to the owner is to be measured by the loss caused to him by
the appropriation. He is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived of, and
no more. To award him less would be unjust to him; to award him more would be unjust
to the public."); LEWIS, s/lna note 36, § 684; 29A C.J.S. Eminernl Domain § 134 (2015);




Assume the farmer's taken property is worth $60,000 and she
will earn a net profit of $20,000 from the newly arable land.
Without considering special benefits, her total compensation
would be $60,000, but that leaves the farmer, and the farmer alone
(not the public at large) $20,000 richer than before the
government project. She is therefore in a better position than she
would have been without the taking, and the government
payment, at taxpayer expense, is unjust. Were the government to
subtract the $20,000 benefit, the farmer would only receive
$40,000 as compensation, putting her in exactly the same financial
position she occupied before DOT took her land.
Conversely, if the government subtracts general benefits, the
result might be unjust to the property owner. Revisiting the new
highway example, DOT might calculate that each town resident
will receive a $500 benefit from the added traffic and faster
transportation. If the farmer is paid $60,000 and that amount is
reduced by the general benefit of $500, then the farmer will
receive $59,500. Other citizens will receive $500 in benefits, which
will leave the farmer $500 worse off than she would have been had
the taking not occurred. This discrepancy demonstrates the
underlying logic of the practice to not offset general benefits, and
courts have long held that an individual property owner should
not bear the burdens of a public project "which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 
48
While there is an obvious logical appeal to the distinction
between general and special benefits, this distinction and the
consequential impacts on compensation are not constitutional
requirements.49 Rather, the Constitution demands only 'just
compensation" and the Court has refused to read that
requirement as weighing-one way or the other-on the benefit-
offset problem.
50
Indeed, the special-general distinction itself, and any implied
prohibition on offsetting benefits, may undermine the justice of
compensation. The special-general distinction presents at least two
practical difficulties. First, the distinction between general and
special benefits is inconsistent and frequently muddled to the
47. 3 NICHOLS, supra note 35, § 8.06; Schopflocher, sukra note 40, at PartV.a.
48. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
49. Baumizn, 167 U.S. at 584.
50. Id.
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point where "the difference between the two is difficult to
ascertain even for trained legal minds. The distinction is further
complicated by the fact that many jurisdictions disagree as to what
constitutes a special benefit."
51  Second, the "shadowy"52
definitions and subjectivity of the distinction create a great deal of
flexibility that can undermine truly just compensation and
confidence in the fairness of eminent domain more broadly.
In the coastal context, the subjectivity of the special-general
distinction is obvious. If a dune restoration project protects the
coastline from future storm surges, is that protection general
because it provides substantial protections to homes further from
the coast? Or is the coastline protection special because the first
row of homeowners is protected from complete destruction while
others are only protected from storm damage? If the dunes system
stretches past 75 houses, is the benefit general because 75 property
owners are benefited or special because only 75 of 75,000 residents
are benefited?
The Supreme Court's handling of the benefit-offset problem is
complex. As the following section illustrates, what the Court says is
often different from what it does. On the one hand the Court
sometimes speaks about the special-general distinction as if it is a
controlling rule. On the other hand, the Court's underlying
analysis, which is much more consistent, shows that the degree of
certainty and calculability of a benefit is the truly controlling
factor.
IV. How HAS THE SUPREME COURT DEALT WITH THE BENEFIT-OFFSET
PROBLEM?
The Supreme Court precedent regarding the benefit-offset
problem begins with the rule that when property is taken, the
former "owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken."53 Early
on, the Court settled on fair market value as the mechanism to give
effect to this command.54 In the case of a partial taking, the Court
51. 3 NICHOLS, supra note 35, § 8A.02 (citing State v. Gatson, 617 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (internal citations omitted)).
52. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Koziatek., 639 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) ("In practical application, the distinction between special and general benefits is
shadowy at best.").
53. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
54. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
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has had a more difficult time articulating a simple rule because of
its adherence to the special-general benefit terminology and
because a partial taking creates opportunity for benefits to accrue
to a remainder.
55
The following Section demonstrates that despite the
inconsistent vocabulary and the confusion it causes with
decisionmakers and lower courts, the Supreme Court's practice is,
in fact, centered on a market value approach, even in the case of
partial takings.5 6 This Section uses the existing case law to justify
the following rule: if a government project or regulation produces
a benefit that is reflected in a higher market value of the
remainder, then there is no net harm to the remainder so no
compensation is owed for damages. The marginal benefit to the
remainder may be offset against compensation for the part of the
property that the government actually took. Courts should not rely
on the unhelpful distinction between special and general benefits
even though the Supreme Court has frequently used those terms.
Rather than relying strictly on the general-special distinction, a
closer analysis of the Court's precedent demonstrates that it has
used benefit-influenced market value to measure compensation
when the benefits are reasonably certain and capable of present
estimation.57 Put differently, in actual practice the Court relies on
fair market value for determining if there are damages to the
remainder, if there are benefits to the remainder, and if a benefit
to the remainder can be subtracted from compensation for the
part taken. Benefits that might accrue to a remainder are only
relevant if they impact fair market value. Distant, unlikely,
speculative, or unquantifiable benefits are not likely to impact fair
market value and are therefore not relevant to compensation.
This balance of this Section explores the use and definition of
fair market value and clarifies the long history of the special-
general distinction that has dominated the benefit-offset
(1973); RIynoklv, 397 U.S. at 16; City of NewYork v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1933).
55. Of course, if the entire property is taken, the "landowner" is no longer really a
landowner and therefore cannot receive a market value benefit from the taking.
56. See, e.g., Almota Farners, 409 U.S. at 474; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376
(1943); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 323 (1932); United States v. River Rouge
Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1926); McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247
U.S. 354, 365-66 (1918); Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 290 (1898); Bauman v.
Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 557-58 (1897); Monangahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.,
312, 326 (1893); Garrison v. City of NewYork, 88 U.S. 196, 204 (1874).
57. E.g., Bau.man, 167 U.S. at 584.
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conversation and long been the source of confusion.
A. Calculating Fair Market Value
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution requires just
compensation when the government takes an individual's
property;58 it does not require fair market value, but courts have
identified fair market value as the best means of achieving justice.
59
As Nichols on Eminent Domain explains, market value "is not an end
in itself, but merely a means to an end; the ultimate object being
the ascertainment of 'just compensation."' 60 Fair market value may
not always give rise to perfect compensation, but it is a "relatively
objective working rule."' 61 The Nichols point is also a reminder that
courts should not forget the constitutional requirements that give
rise to the use of fair market value as the central test for just
compensation.
The Court defines market value as the price a "willing buyer
would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time of the taking." 
62
Market value is not necessarily the same as the owner's investment
in the property because the owner may have paid too much or too
little for it.63 Likewise, the property's value may have declined or
increased since the owner's purchase and subsequent
investments.64 In other words, "[i]t is the property and not the cost
of it that is safeguarded by state and Federal Constitutions."
' 65
Moreover, the fair market value does not depend on the current or
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. Eg., Miller, 317 U.S. at 373-74. Although it is well settled that market value is the
correct approach for setting just compensation, United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16
(1970), there are various arguments for alternative measures, and arriving at market value
is not always a simple process. Some commentators have argued for a restitution standard
that compensates at a level equal to the benefit that the taker receives. Others have argued
for an indemnification standard that compensates at a level equaling the loss to the owner.
E.g., DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 172-73 (2002).
Additionally, appraisers can use any number of standards for determining the actual
market value of property, including sales history, comparable sales, capitalization of rental
value, and rebuilding costs. Id. at 170-71.
60. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 35, § 12.02.
61. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S 506, 511 (1979) (citing Miller, 317
U.S. at 374; United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949)).
62. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 506.
63. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
64. Id.




past use of property, but on "all the uses for which it is suitable."66
Market value is not measured by loss of profits, goodwill, or the
expense of relocation.67 It is likewise not measured by the cost of
substitute property.68
Much of this definition focuses on what market value is not.
Fair market value does consider all the transferable uses (as
opposed to owner-specific uses) for which the property is generally
suited.69 An assessment of fair market value could therefore
consider the highest and best use of a property, existing
restrictions on use of the property (for example, zoning
restrictions), the amount of time it would take to sell the property,
recent good faith sales of the property, recent good faith sales of
similar properties, the value of improvements to the property, and
the productive value of property.
70
The fair market value test for just compensation dates back to
the Supreme Court's earliest cases.71 Courts have long referred to
the touchstone of just compensation as "value," "market value,"
"fair market value," and "market value fairly determined."
72
Justice Owen Roberts once added that "the term 'fair' hardly adds
anything to the phrase 'market value."' 73 Regardless of the exact
phrasing, the Fifth Amendment assures that "no private property
shall be appropriated to pubic uses unless a full and exact
equivalent for it be returned to the owner" and the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the "equivalent is the market value
of the property."
74
The Court identified early on that the Constitution demands
that compensation not be "just". "merely to the individual whose
property is taken, but to the public which is to pay for it." 75 Where
the government compensates a property owner below market
value, the compensation may be unjust to the property owner.
76
66. Id.
67. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946).
68. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 26 (1984).
69. 4 NICHOLS, sutira note 35, § 12.02.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Sear] v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S. 553, 564 (1890).
72. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
73. Id.
74. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 254, 255 (1934) (citing Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)).
75. Garrison v. City of NewYork, 88 U.S. 196, 204 (1874).
76. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); Searl, 133 U.S. at 562.
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Where the government compensates the property owner above
market value, the compensation may be unjust to the public that,
through its tax dollars, must pay for the compensation.77 Whether
serving as a rule of thumb for objective judicial decision-making or
as a safeguard of justice, fair market value has been critical to the
Court's effectuation of the Compensation Clause.
78
Determining market value is far from a science, requiring both
judgment and math,79 and relying on market demand, economic
development, permitted uses, and other considerations that
provide a quantifiable and reasonably certain view of property
value.80 Determining fair market value, again, is not the goal of the
inquiry; it is merely a means of quantifying just compensation.8'
Throughout the Court's jurisprudence, fair market value
assessments have taken account of any real, actual, certain,
reasonably probable, calculable, quantitative benefits that accrue
to property as a result of the taking.8 2 These assessments have
ignored any uncertain, conjectural, speculative, contingent, merely
supposed benefits that are either incapable of estimation or
incalculable.8 3 Notwithstanding its use of the terms special and
general, the Court has not ignored benefits simply because they
are widespread.
B. Special and General Benefits Are Mere Descriptors, Not a Test of
Compensability
The Supreme Court has been dealing with market value as a
measure of just compensation for nearly 150 years.8 4 Over that
time it has developed a robust, if not singularly articulated,
doctrine. One aspect of that doctrine that suffers from confusion is
the role of the terms "special benefit" and "general benefit." This
Section is an effort to clarify the history of those terms at the
Supreme Court. In short, the distinction between "special" and
77. See Bauman, 167 U.S. at 574; Searl, 133 U.S. at 562.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) ("The Court in an
endeavor to find working rules that will do substantial justice has adopted practical
standards, including that of market value.").
79. Standard Oil Co. ofNJ. v. S. Pac. Co., 268 U.S. 146, 156 (1925).
80. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Harnmons, 550 So. 2d 767, 771 (La. Ct. App.
1989).
81. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 35, § 12.02.
82. See inf ia Section IV.B.
83. 1I.
84. E ., Garrison v. City of NewYork, 88 U.S. 196 (1874).
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"general" benefit is irrelevant, having largely been applied as a post
hoc, shorthand descriptor of benefits after the Court has
determined whether to offset them. As the discussion immediately
below illustrates, the Court began its treatment of the benefit-offset
problem by focusing solely on the need to be just, without regard
to the breadth of the benefit. It then developed a more precise
focus on market value. In time it introduced the terms "special"
and "general," but never with reliance on the scope of the benefit.
Certainty and calculability, not generality, is the centerpiece of the
Court's doctrine.
The idea that a widespread benefit is "general" and cannot be
offset is not founded in the earliest benefit-offset cases. Although
not a Supreme Court decision, one of the earliest appearances of
the benefit-offset problem is captured in a D.C. Circuit Court
opinion from 1829.85 In this case, there was a partial taking for the
purposes of building a canal.8 6 The trial court instructed the jury
to consider the "actual benefit" that would accrue to the
remaining property by virtue of its contiguity with the new canal.
87
"If the jury should be satisfied that the individual would, by the
proposed public work, receive a benefit to the full value of the
property taken," then it is right to consider that benefit in
offsetting compensation.8 8 The district court, therefore, began a
line of reasoning that relied on the actuality and certainty of a
benefit. The decision was clearly not based on the breadth of the
benefit because the canal would undoubtedly have had a
widespread impact on many properties along its path.
Absorbing this reasoning into the Supreme Court's case law,
the 1874 case Garrison v. City of New York similarly accepted that a
court could offset certain benefits to a remainder even in the case
of a benefit as common as a road improvement.89 It was here that
the Court recognized the constitutional problem of ignoring
genuine benefits: compensation must be 'just, not merely to the
individual whose property is taken, but to the public which is to
pay for it.-90 Failure to consider any benefits that, in fact, accrue to
the property means that the public will subsidize a windfall to the
85. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key, 5 F. Cas. 563 (D.C. Cir. 1829).
86. Id. at 563.
87. Id. at 564.
88. Id.
89. Garrison, 88 U.S. at 198.
90. Id. at 204.
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owner.
In the late nineteenth century, several cases demonstrated a
focus on certainty over commonality in setting compensation, even
though they did not directly address benefit offsetting in partial
takings. In the 1890 case Searl v. School District No. 2, the Court
dealt with a property on which a school building had been
constructed.91 The Court noted in dicta that it is easy to determine
the value of the building distinct from the underlying property,
92
and commented approvingly that when the government began to
consider compensation, "the inquiry was limited to such
compensation as was just, and did not embrace remote or
speculative damages."93 Here, the Court dealt not with speculative
benefits, but instead with speculative damages from the taking.
94
Despite the fact that damages are the opposite of benefits, Searl
highlights the Court's early and continuing discomfort with
speculation in the realm ofjust compensation for partial takings.
In 1893 the Court addressed lands taken for a park in Shoemaker
v. United States and looked specifically at the certainty of benefits
arising from the condemnation.95 At the time of condemnation for
a new city park, a set of commissioners was appointed to 'set
compensation.96 A statute instructed the commissioners to make
their determination by considering the value of the lands "in the
market" and "at its market value."97 Moreover, the commissioners
were to ignore "purely speculative purposes" to which the
property might be put.98 The Court approved of these instructions
without comment about he breadth of the park's benefits, adding
that compensation should not include "evidence of conjectural or
speculative values."99 Confronting widespread benefits for the first
time-that is, the benefits associated with a new park-the Court
focused not on the breadth of those benefits, but on their level of
certainty.
In 1893, the same year as Shoemaker, the Court reversed a lower
court's judgment in part because the lower court failed to consider
91. Searl v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S. 553 (1890).
92. Id. at 562.
93. Id. at 564.
94. Id.
95. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 284 (1893).
96. Id. at 304.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 305.
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factors that were not at all speculative. 100 Monongahela rose when
the United States exercised eminent domain to acquire a lock and
dam on the Monongahela River.'0' The government assessed the
value of the property, but it explicitly did not consider the value of
tolls that the previous owner collected and that the government, as
the new owner, could also collect.102 The trial court accepted the
government's toll-free compensation award.l°3 The Supreme Court
reversed, stating that the tolls do increase the value of the
property, and should be included in a compensation award.0 4 The
tolls were easily calculable and not speculative for two reasons.
First, the Court was able to review the average toll income over the
past several years to get a well-informed idea of the future toll
income.10 5 Perhaps more importantly, the value increase from the
tolls was easily calculable because it was set by Pennsylvania law. 106
As with Searl, Monongahela dealt not with offsetting benefits for a
partial taking, but with factoring different values into
compensation for a total taking. However, for the purposes of the
present analysis, it demonstrates a continuing focus on certainty
and calculability.
In dicta, Monongahela does express one ostensibly contrary
position. While trying to distinguish the certain benefits that arise
from toll collection, the Court also stated that it should not
consider "any supposed benefit that the owner may recieve [sic] in
common with all." 07 This is a rare mention in the Court's case law,
suggesting that breadth is a relevant consideration. However, the
more operative word here is "supposed," as the Court is still
speaking to uncertainty and speculation.0 8  Later cases
demonstrate that where "common" benefits are not "supposed"
but are rather benefits in fact, fair market compensation may
reflect those benefits.10 9
100. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 329 (1893).
101. Id. at 312.
102. Id. at 313-14.
103. Id. at 319.
104. Id. at 328-29.
105. Id. at 318.
106. Id. at 329.
107. Id. at 326.
108. Id.
109. E.g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 415-16
(1926); McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 365-66 (1918); Bauman v. Ross,
167 U.S. 548, 557-58 (1897).
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Decided in 1897, Bauman v. Ross is the first case to address the
benefit-offset problem head-on with respect to partial takings and
remainders."10 In Bauman, Congress (as the municipal government
of the District of Columbia) began a project to improve the street
layout in the District."' The project involved partially condemning
tracts for laying roads, but leaving remainders adjacent to the
newly improved roads.l12 The act authorizing the project expected
that the real benefits of the road improvement would be
considered in the award. The act directed that a jury, when
considering compensation, "shall take into consideration the
benefit [that] the purpose for which [the property] is taken may
be to the owner or owners of such tract or parcel by enhancing the
value of the remainder of the same.""' The Court upheld this
provision. "
4
In its analysis, the Bauman court carefully reviewed the laws of
several states and identified a consistency in their assessments:
courts would offset benefits that were "direct," "actual," "in fact,"
"proximate," "immediately accruing," "capable of present
estimate," or capable of "reasonable computation." 115 At the same
time, the Court rejected, and saw others reject, benefits that were
in the "indefinite future," "contingent and speculative," or might
only "arise in the future."" 6 These distinctions fit perfectly with
the notion that courts may reduce compensation based on a real,
certain, and calculable benefit to a remainder. This is particularly
true when considered in tandem with the Court's holding on the
issue of the benefit-offset:
The constitution of the United States contains no express
prohibition against considering benefits in estimating the just
compensation to be paid for private property taken for the public
use; and, for the reasons and upon the authorities above stated,
no such prohibition can be implied; and it is therefore within the
authority of congress, in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, to direct that, when part of a parcel of land is
appropriated to the public use for a highway in the District of
110. See Baumav, 167 U.S. at 548.
111. id. at 551.
112. See id. at 550-51.
113. Id. at 557 (first alteration in original, second alteration not in original).
114. i. at584.
115. Id. at576-82.
116. Id. at 577, 584.
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Columbia, the tribunal vested by law with the duty of assessing
the compensation or damages due to the owner, whether for the
value of the part taken, or for any injury to the rest, shall take
into consideration, by way of lessening the whole or either part of
the sum due him, any special and direct benefits, capable of
present estimate and reasonable computation, caused by the
establishment of the highway to the part not taken.'1 7
Unfortunately, the Court here introduced the term "special
benefits."18  Already, that term had been used in other
jurisdictions as an opposite of "general benefits," meaning those
benefits "in common with all lands in the neighborhood"'1 9 or
"benefits which result to the public as a whole." 120
The Court introduced confusion that persists to this day by
implying that only narrowly accruing benefits could be considered
while those that were broadly applicable must be ignored. The
Court had approved of offsetting the benefits of road
improvements, which are distinctly widespread, relying on
certainty and calculability rather than breadth, but its elevation of
the term "special benefits" underlies the constricting use of these
terms over the past century. For example, in an 1898
condemnation case, the Court wrote that "such assessment must
be measured or limited by the special benefits accruing to it (that
is, by the benefits that are not shared by the general public)." 121 In
that case there is reference only to breadth and none to certainty.
Although it would not end the confusion, in 1918 the Court
issued an opinion in McCoy v. Union Elevated Rail, which reinforced
Bauman's focus on certainty rather than breadth, and further
paired this certainty test with the longstanding reliance on fair
market value. 122 William McCoy owned a hotel in Chicago adjacent
to a new elevated railroad.123 Although the railway included two
station stops in the vicinity of McCoy's hotel which were proven to
have increased the value of his property and his business, McCoy
117. Id, at 584.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 577 (citing Mecham v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 291, 298-99 (Mass.
1849)).
120. Id. at 581 (citing Comm'rs v. O'Sullivan, 17 Kan. 58, 60 (1876)).
121. Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 294 (1898) (discussing assessments
rather than just compensation, but there is no indication that the distinction would be
substantially different between the two).
122. McCoyv. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 364, 364-65 (1918).
123. Id. at 355.
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argued that these benefits could not be considered when setting
just compensation for the government taking of easements
appurtenant to his property.124 The jury had been instructed that
"benefits" mean:
benefits and damages to the market value [of the property], and
that the term 'market value' . . . is meant the price at which the
owner ... would under ordinary circumstances surrounding the
sales of his property have sold the property for, and what a
person desirous as purchaser would have paid for it under the
same circumstances.125
At the same time, the instructions told the jury that they should
not consider any "general benefits" that are "common to the
public at large" even though they should consider any
enhancement to the "fair cash market value by reason of the
construction," which is a "special benefit."'126 The instructions
both promulgated the misleading general-special distinction and
seemed to offer contradictory direction: that the jury should look
at market value increases from the project but not increases from
the project that might apply broadly.
The Supreme Court recognized this confusion and
contradiction and commented that a state may permit
consideration of "actual benefits-enhancements in market value-
flowing directly from a public work, although all in the neighborhood
receive like advantages."' 127 Unfortunately, while McCoy clearly says
that there is no reason widespread benefits cannot be offset from
compensation, it does not go as far as to clearly jettison the special-
general distinction.
Thanks to McCoy, a certainty-based approach began to take
firmer hold despite lingering terminological confusion. In 1926,
the Court held in River Rogue Improvement Co. that a court could
consider "direct" and "immediate" benefits, but explained that by
virtue of being direct and immediate, they were "special" even
though common to all others. 28 This holding exemplifies the
emerging post hoc nature of the special-benefit distinction. A court
124. Id. at 355-56.
125. Id. at 358.
126. Id. at 359-60.
127. Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
128. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1926).
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first determines whether the nature of the benefit is sufficiently
certain and calculable. If it is, then the court can offset the benefit.
After making that determination, the court terms the benefit
"special" without regard to its breadth.
The confusion persists. As recently as 1974 the Court
mentioned-and avoided-the unique nature of special benefits,
suggesting that whether or not benefits were "special" was a
threshold compensation question.129 Even in oral arguments for
Home (the raisin case), counsel cautioned the Court away from
delving in to the special-general quagmire.13
0
In the cases so far covered, the Court has performed an analysis
focused on the certainty and calculability of benefits and, as a
result, has upheld government offsets of such benefits. Although it
jumps back in time by a generation, in 1934, in Olson v. Unites
States, the Court clearly utilized the certainty analysis but
nevertheless found that the benefits at issue were too speculative to
influence fair market value.131 Olson involved condemnation for a
reservoir.132 The government argued that the change brought
about by the new reservoir would allow the neighboring property
owners, whose land was subject to a partial taking, to use their
frontage for power generation.133 The remaining property was
certainly "physically adaptable" for power generation, but that
outcome was contingent on all the landowners agreeing to work
together. 3 The Court held that the potential use for power
generation could not be offset because it was too speculative.
135
Such use would require cooperation and a series of new easements
among the property owners.136 The Court held that compensation
is set on market value, which is based on all elements of value that
can arise from the property in the "reasonably near future." 137 The
Court distinguished this "near future" value from uses or values
that are not "reasonably held to affect the market value." 1 38 Even if
129. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 151 (1974).
130. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419
(2015) (No. 14-275), 2015 WL 2473384.
131. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934).
132. Id. at 248.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 256-57.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. ld. at 255.
138. Id. at 256.
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a use is "within the realm of possibility," it should not be
considered in setting compensation if it is not "reasonably
probable."'139 If a use is not reasonably probable it is merely
speculative and conjectural.
As time progressed, the Court focused more on market value.
The Court recognized that using the increased market value of the
remainder as a basis for offsetting compensation for the part taken
avoids unnecessary complexity and uncertainty in the valuation
process.140 In 1983 the Court set aside a measure of value based on
speculation in favor of market value, writing that a speculative
"approach would add uncertainty and complexity to the valuation
proceeding without any necessary improvement in the process."1 41
"Where private property is taken for public use, and there is a
market price prevailing at the time and place of the taking, that
price is just compensation."42 There is no reason to distinguish
narrow and broad benefits when market value inherently accounts
for all benefits that are reasonably certain and capable of present
calculation.
In 2015's Home v. Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court
was presented with an opportunity to again address the benefit-
offset problem in partial takings cases and to clarify the line of
cases discussed in this Section. Unfortunately, the Court did not
take that opportunity and instead created even more confusion.
With the growing need for coastal resilience projects, there is a
very real possibility that the Court will face this challenge again,
and fortunately, the New Jersey Supreme Court has provided a
thorough and well-reasoned articulation of the proper benefit-
offset rule. The following Section details the New Jersey court's
recent resolution of this problem, and the subsequent Section
describes Home in more detail.
V. A NEWJERSEY RESILIENCE PROJECT BRINGS FOCUS TO THE FAILINGS
OF THE SPECIAL-GENERAL DISTINCTION
Given its location along the mid-Atlantic coast, NewJersey faces
a particular threat from the rising sea levels and intense storms
139. Id. at 257.
140. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 35 (1984).
141. Id.




that accompany climate change.143 New Jersey has 127 miles of
coast,14 4 the vast majority of which has a "high" or "very high"
vulnerability risk. 145 Hurricane Sandy was a particularly devastating
example of New Jersey's plight, destroying homes, historic and
valuable commercial centers such as boardwalks and amusement
parks, and otherwise battering much of the coast.146 The coast's
vulnerability demands climate change adaptation and mitigation
policies, but the state's disjointed and at times contradictory case
law-which until recently mimicked the United States Supreme
Court's doctrine-made effective resilience policies seem an even
greater challenge. 1
47
A barrier island at the southern end of Ocean County, New
Jersey, Long Beach Island has a year-round population of roughly
12,000, which booms in the summer months when families fill the
nearly 18,000 seasonal second homes.148 Tourism-related fields
including real estate, food service, retail, and construction are the
top industries in this region, contributing to the $14.2 billion gross
county product for Ocean County. 149
Recognizing the value of Long Beach Island to the economy as
a whole, the nine Long Beach Island municipalities, as well as the
state of New Jersey and the federal government, jointly established
a massive beach restoration and storm protection project for the
island. 50 One of the key components of this effort was a dune
nourishment effort that would significantly enlarge the existing
dune system all along Long Beach Island, thereby protecting the
structures behind the new dunes from storm surges and
143. See generally Leigh Phillips, U.S. Northeast Coast is Hotspot Jor Rising Sea Levels,
NATURE, Jun. 24, 2012, http://www.nature.com/news/us-northeast-coast-is-hotspot-for-
rising-sea-levels-1.10880.
144. NORBERT P. PSUTY & DOUGLAS D. OFIARA, COASTAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT:
LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FROM NEWJERSEY 9-10 (Rutgers Univ. Press eds., 2002).
145. E. Robert Thieler & Erika S. Hammer-Klose, National Assessment ol Coastal
Vulnerability to Sea-Level Rise: Preliminary Results for the U.S. Atlantic Coast Fig. 4, USGS (1999),
h ttp:/ /pubs.usgs.gov/ of/1999/of99-593/ pages/figpage/fig4.h tml..
146. E.g., Kevin J. Mahoney, Comment, Mitigating Myopia: Climate Change, Rolling
Easements, and the Jersey Shore, 44 SEATON HALL L. REV. 1130, 1131-32 (2014), available at
http://scholarship.shu.edu/shlr/vol44/iss4/6/.
147. See e.g., id.
148. Ken McGill & Jon Gray, Thue 2011 Economic Impact of Tourism in Southern Ocean




150. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 527 (NJ. 2013).
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flooding.'51 These dunes were constructed adjacent to the private
homes along the shore, in most cases on the homeowners' private
property.152 Thus, while the Army Corps of Engineers carried out
most of the technical aspects of this project under the federal-state-
local arrangement, the towns were responsible for acquiring the
property rights to build the dunes that would cross each
property. 153
In the Borough of Harvey Cedars, towards the northern end of
Long Beach Island, town officials were responsible for gaining
permissions on eighty-two properties.54 Officials were able to
reach agreements with sixty-six property owners, leaving sixteen
properties on which the Borough had to exercise eminent
domain. 155 One of these properties in the latter category belonged
to Harvey and Phyllis Karan.156 The Karans' property was 11,868
square feet on which the new dune would occupy a 3,381square
foot strip on the ocean-side.157 The Borough offered the Karans
$300 for the right to build and maintain a new dune on the land,
which the Karans refused, arguing that they deserved
compensation not only for the land the Borough would take to
build the dune, but also for the damage to their remaining
property.158 Specifically, the Karans asserted that the dune project
would damage their remaining property by limiting their coveted
ocean view. 159
When the Karans did not consent to the project, the Borough
of Harvey Cedars began an eminent domain proceeding and
acquired the property by condemnation.160 As New Jersey law
requires, the trial court appointed a commission to determine just





155. 1(/. at 527-28.





161. Id.; see also Eminent Domain Act of 1971, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-12(b) (Westlaw
2016) ("Upon determination that the condemnor is authorized to and has duly exercised
its power of eminent domain, the court shall appoint 3 commissioners to determine the
compensation to be paid by reason of the exercise of such power.").
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compensation at $700.162 The Karans rejected this sum of
compensation -which, of course, was only $400 more than the
initial offer-and demanded ajury trial. 
163
As these legal proceedings progressed, it was no secret that the
new dune system along Long Beach Island, and in Harvey Cedars
in particular, would protect the Karans' home from a major
storm.164 The Army Corps of Engineers' expert determined that
without the new dunes, there was a 56% chance that in the next
thirty years a storm would destroy the Karans' home.65 With the
dunes in place, however, the Karans could expect their house to be
safe for the next two centuries. 1
66
The Karans understood the potential benefits of the dune
system, but in order to maximize their monetary situation, or
perhaps to stop the condemnation altogether, their strategy was to
rely on New Jersey's existing just compensation jurisprudence.
This jurisprudence seemed to command that when setting
compensation for the property taken and the remainder, the
judge, jury, or commission must ignore any benefits that accrue
generally to the public at large even if those benefits also accrue to
the specific property at issue.167 With respect to the Karans, even
though a willing buyer would likely pay more to gain the storm-
protection benefit, the Karans relied on a line of benefit-offset
cases suggesting that this fair market increase was not sufficient to
lower their compensation since all the neighboring houses would
also increase in value.
The Borough of Harvey Cedars might have explained to the
jury that, indeed, the dune project would take away a piece of the
Karans' property and, as to the remainder, it would have a severely
diminished view of the ocean. Nevertheless, the town would argue
that the storm-protection benefit-the fact that the new dunes
would enable the home to survive the next big storm-outweighed
these costs.168 Therefore, prior to the trial the Karans requested a
162. Petition for Certification and Appendix on Behalf of Plaintiff/Petitioner
Borough of Harvey Cedars at 10, Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (No. A-4555-10T3).
163. Karan, 70 A.3d at 528.
164. Id. at 529.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 528.
168. See id. ("Before trial, the Karans moved to bar any testimony from the
Borough's expert, Dr. Donald M. Molliver, Ph.D., concerning storm-protection benefits
afforded by the dune that increased the value of the Karans' home.").
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hearing to determine whether the jury could consider any
arguments regarding the benefits of the dune system.1
69
Ultimately, the judge determined that the jury should not consider
the storm protection benefits.170 The case went to trial and the
jury, instructed to ignore these benefits, calculated that the
Borough of Harvey Cedars owed the Karans compensation in the
amount of $375,000.171
The Borough appealed this award, first to the New Jersey
appellate court, which agreed with the trial judge that the court
could not offset so-called "general benefits." 172 The Borough then
appealed to the NewJersey Supreme Court, which considered New
Jersey's occasional practice of ignoring general benefits, but opted
to change the law.1
73
The question presented to the New Jersey Supreme Court in
the case of Harvey Cedars v. Karan was how to calculate just
compensation considering both the Karans' reduced ocean view
and improved storm protection.174 Lest there be any question
about the reality of the improved storm protection, the parties
argued this case on May 13, 2013,175 only six months after
Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New Jersey.17 6 The Army Corps
of Engineers constructed the new dune system in front of the
Karans' home in 2008.177 Because of that protective barrier, the
Karans' home survived the storm that ravaged the coast and the
neighboring towns without improved dune systems. 1
78
The New Jersey court began its analysis by distinguishing
between two situations in which just compensation is due. In the
first situation, the state government will owe just compensation
169. Id.
170. Id. at 529.
171. Id. at 531.
172. Id. at 532.
173. See generally Karan, 70 A.3d 524.
174. Id. at 526.
175. Id. at 524.
176. Hurricane Sandy Makes Lawudall near Atlantic City, THE STAR-LEDGER (Oct. 29,
2012),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/10/huriicane-san dy makes-landfall.html.
177. Karan, 70 A.3d at 528.
178. See, e.g., Nicholas Huba & Kirk Moore, lla'riey Cedars lomreowners Demand Payment
from Town for Spoiling Ocean View, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Dec. 20, 2012, 3:12 PM),
http://archive.app.com/ai-ticle/20121125/NJNEWS2002/311250050/ ("Thanks to a line
of recently erected two-story high sand dunes, Harvey and Phyllis Karan's $1.7 million
oceanfront house, and the town, stood fast whet) Sandy stormed ashore.").
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when it takes an entire piece of property, 79 for example, when it
acquires 100% of a lot in order to build a school or when it
acquires a boat to use in a war effort. In the second situation, the
government will owe just compensation when it takes a portion of
the property,180 not only for that portion of property actually
taken, but also for any reduction in value to the remaining
property. 181
In New Jersey, when the government acquires an entire piece
of property through eminent domain, "the measure [of just
compensation] is the fair market value of the property as of the
date of the taking, determined by what a willing buyer and a
willing seller would agree to, neither being under any compulsion
to act." 182
When, as with the Karans, the government takes less than the
entire property, the analysis of New Jersey courts "has not
necessarily reflected the straightforward fair market value
approach that is evident in total-takings cases." 183 Generally in a
partial takings case, the government will use eminent domain to
acquire a segment of property, for which it would pay the fair
market value. However, by severing the property and taking
possession of a part, there may be damage to the portion of
property that remains with the private owner. This damage may
result from the government's use of the taken portion-for
example, if noise and vibrations from a new rail line decrease the
value-or from the fact that the remainder can no longer be used
in the same manner-for example, if a rail line bifurcates a farm,
making efficient harvest impossible.
But when the value of the remainder increases, can the
government offset the compensation by the increase?
The compensation calculation for partial takings prior to Karan
revolved around the special-general benefits distinction. 84
Recognizing both the troubling policy implications of this
distinction-specifically, that the Karans could receive $375,000
179. Karan, 70 A.3d at 535.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Silver, 457 A.2d 463, 466-67 (NJ. 1983)
(alteration in original) (citing, inter alia, City of Trenton v. Lenzner, 109 A.2d 409, 414
(NJ. 1954), cert. drnied, 348 U.S. 972 (1955)).
183. Kaan, 70 A.3d at 535.
184. See, e.g., id.
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from the government, while it protects the very existence of the
home which they claim was damaged-and the subjective,
malleable gradient on which the distinction relies, the Karan court
looked carefully at New Jersey law to determine the roots of the
special-general benefits distinction.
185
The court concluded that the special-general distinction
"bedeviled" 186 prior courts with varying definitions and
inconsistent applications of the imprecise rule. 87 The two cases
that present the most confusion are two of the earliest.
The benefit-offset problem in New Jersey often focused on the
railroads, much as it did in other states.188 In the 1889 case of
Sullivan v. North Hudson County Railroad Company, authored by
Justice Dixon, 189 the railroad was building an elevated railway in
front of two properties.90 The railroad argued that, when
calculating compensation for damages to those properties, the
court should offset any benefits, and consider the operation of the
railroad as a benefit in itself.'91 The Sullivan court defined general
benefits as "those which affect the whole community or
neighborhood, by increasing the facility of transportation,
attracting population, and the like."' 92 Special benefits, on the
other hand, were defined as "those which directly increase the
value of the particular tract crossed." 93 The court ruled that only
special benefits should be set off from compensation. 19
4
Mangles v. Hudson County Board of Chosen Freeholders reexamined
the issue in 1892 and exacerbated the confusion in the way it
described general benefits.95 In Mangles the state took a portion of
several properties for the purpose of widening a highway. The
Court considered the certainty of the highway's benefits, and the
ability to calculate those benefits, without considering the breadth
185. Id.
186. I. at 536.
187. Id. at 535-40.
188. Id. at 536 (citing Sullivan v. N. Hudson Cty. R.R. Co., 18 A. 689, 690 (N.J.
1889)).
189. Sullivan, 18 A. at 689.
190. d. at 689.




195. Mangles v. Hudson Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 25 A. 322 (N.J. 1892).
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of benefits.196 The court declared that it should not deduct any
benefits that would only arise in the "indefinite future" or benefits
that are so "uncertain in character as to be incapable of present
estimation." 197 Justice Dixon, again writing for the court, described
these uncertain, incalculable, and indefinite benefits as "general
benefit[s]," 198 adding confusion to the doctrine because in
Sullivan he used "general benefits" to describe only those that are
widespread, without reference to certainty or calculability.199 In
reference to the breadth or specificity of the benefits in Mangles,
Dixon says only that benefits enjoyed by the entire "community or
neighborhood" are "usually styled 'general benefits'" but the fact
that they are widespread and therefore general does not mean
they cannot be subtracted from the award if they "admit[] of
reasonable computation."' 20 0 Justice Dixon reasoned that in the
case of the highway project, the increased value of land along the
improved road was not speculative and was calculable at the time
the taking occurred.20 1 In deciding that "general benefits,"
regardless of breadth, could be offset if they are specific and
calculable, Justice Dixon changed the rule he announced in
Sullivan.
It is with Mangles that New Jersey law begins to confuse the
scope of the benefit-that is, whether the benefit is common to all
neighbors or unique to the property at issue-with the nature of
the benefit-whether the benefit is reasonably certain and
reasonably calculable.20 2 This same type of confusion in the United
States Supreme Court's jurisprudence is likely the reason the
Court the avoided tackling the benefit-offset problem in Home. In
New Jersey, this exact confusion forced the New Jersey Supreme
Court to finally resolve the benefit-offset problem in Karan.
To further highlight the Mangles-induced confusion in its
jurisprudence, the Karan court proceeded to consider three
additional New Jersey cases in which the courts respectively: (1)
196. Id. at 323.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 324.
199. Sullivan, 18 A. at 690 ("[G]eneral benefits" are "those which affect the whole
community or neighborhood.").
200. Mangles, 25 A. at 324.
201. Id.
202. Id. ("But any benefit which accompanies the act of taking the land for the
contemplated use, and which admits of reasonable computation, may enter into the
award.") (emphasis added).
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disallowed the offset of what they termed "general benefits"
without defining that term or considering whether the benefits in
the case were capable of calculation and were non-conjectural;203
(2) disallowed what they termed "general benefits" but defining
that term as those benefits "which a property owner may enjoy in the
future in common with all other property owners in the area;"
204
and similarly (3) disallowed offsetting because benefits can only
offset if they provide "an advantage likely to accrue to [the
remaining] property over and above the advantages to other
property in the vicinity." 205 This degree of inconsistency around
offsetting benefits, paired with the growing concern over coastal
adaptation generally and dune replenishment more specifically,
forced the New Jersey Supreme Court to articulate a clear and
administrable rule.
Despite the confusion it helped create, Mangles did introduce a
standard, one focused on the fair market value as set by real and
calculable benefits,20 6 from which the New Jersey Supreme Court
could begin to fashion its modern rule. As described above, the
articulation of this standard, side-by-side with Sullivan, created
significant confusion in New Jersey's jurisprudence for more than
a century, but Karan offers clarity, consistency with many other
jurisdictions including the United States Supreme Court's analysis
if not nominal rules, and important public policy outcomes.
207
In its unanimous opinion, the Karan court declared that it
"need not pay slavish homage to labels that have outlived their
usefulness" and explained "the terms special and general benefits
do more to obscure than illuminate the basic principles governing
the computation of just compensation in eminent domain
cases." 208 Eschewing the distinction, the court held that "[t] he fair-
market considerations that inform computing just compensation
in partial-takings cases should be no different than in total-takings
cases. They are the considerations that a willing buyer and a willing
seller would weigh in coming to an agreement on the property's
203. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 538-39 (N.J. 2013) (citing
Village of Ridgewood v. Sreel Inv. Corp., 145 A.2d 306, 312 (NJ. 1958)).
204. Id. at 539 (quoting State v. Interpace Corp., 327 A.2d 225, 229 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1974)).
205. Id. (quoting NJ. Tpk. Auth. v. Herrontown Woods, Inc. 367 A.2d 893, 896-97
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)).
206. Mangles, 25 A. at 324.
207. Karan, 70 A.3d at 538-40.
208. Id. at 540.
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value at the time of the taking." 2 09
Relying on the intent of Mangles, which was a focus on certainty
and calculability, the court laid out a clear rule, doing away with
the special-general distinction210 and instead holding that 'just
compensation should be based on non-conjectural and quantifiable
benefits.., that are capable of reasonable calculation at the time
of the taking."' 211 With that rule in mind, it was not a stretch for the
court to reason that "[a] willing purchaser of beachfront property
would obviously value the view and proximity to the ocean. But it is
also likely that a rational purchaser would place a value on a
protective barrier that shielded his property from partial or total
destruction.' 2 1 2 In other words, the government taking offers
benefits to the Karans' property at the same time that it causes
damages and courts should not provide compensation based on
the damages, while ignoring the benefits. Relying on a special-
general distinction, which allows offsetting of only a limited
number of real and calculable benefits, would ignore too many
benefits and therefore provide owners like the Karans with a
windfall when their property actually increases in value because of
the taking. By relying on a market value approach to
compensation, the New Jersey court settled on a rule that takes
cognizance of the real value of a remainder. If a purchaser would
pay more, then the taking has not only harmed the remainder, it
has also produced a non-speculative benefit that the court can
subtract from compensation. If a purchaser would pay less, then
there has been damage, and the government must pay
compensation.
Because the lower court prohibited the jury from considering
evidence of how the dune replenishment project would actually
and quantifiably benefit the Karans' property remainder, the New
Jersey Supreme Court ordered a new trial.213 Prior to that trial, the
Karans agreed to settle with the Borough of Harvey Cedars for $1,
putting an end to this particular conflict and to their windfall.214
The larger confusion over the benefit-offset problem still lingers,
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 541.
213. Jd. at 544.
214. MatyAn n Spoto, hamey Cedars Couple leceives $1 Settlement for D ne Blocking Ocean.
View, THE STAR-LEDGER (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2013/09/
harvey-cedars-sanddune-dispute-settled.html.
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however, at the federal level.
VI. RAISIN REGULATIONS RAISE RECONSIDERATIONS OF THE BENEFIT-
OFFSET PROBLEM
Surprisingly, the complexity and ambiguity of the United States
Supreme Court's current partial takings doctrine is most recently
demonstrated in a case stemming from depression-era regulations,
not about climate change or coasts, but about California raisins.
The Great Depression and its aftermath presented some of
"the most difficult and chaotic" economic conditions in United
States history.215 The banking system shut down and defaults were
widespread among "every class of borrower except the Federal
government."21 6 This wave of disorder did not spare the
agriculture industry, which was already suffering from a substantial
price collapse in the 1920s.217 In response, the Federal government
enacted 130 new agriculture-related laws between 1933 and 1939,
almost twice as many as in the previous fifty years.218 Congress
enacted 60% of these new laws for price support and supply
management.21 9 One such law was the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, which authorized raisin regulations.
220
The Agricultural Marketing Act authorizes a "marketing
order,"221 requiring raisin growers to provide a portion of their
crop (the "reserve" portion) to a government Raisin Committee in
order to control the supply and therefore the market price of
raisins.222 The Committee takes ownership of the raisins and then
donates them, sells them outside of the primary raisin market (to
federal agencies, foreign governments, or exporters, for example),
215. Ben S. Bernanke, Non-Moaetnaq fect" of the inancial (jr/sis in P-'arpagation of the
Gieal Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 257, 257 (1983).
216. Id.
217. See Gary D. Libecap, The Great Depression and the Regulating State: Federal
Government Regulation of Agriculture: 1884-1970, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT
DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 181, 186 (Michael
D. Bordo, Claudia Goldin & Eugene N. White eds., 1998).
218. Id. at 183.
219. See id.
220. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.) (West 2016).
221. Agricultural Marketing AgreementAct, 7 U.S.C. § 602 (West 2016).
222. Home v. Dep't. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015); see aLo Raisins Produced
from Grapes Grown in California, 7 C.F.R. §§ 989.65-.72 (2015).
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or otherwise gets rid of the product.223
Raisin growers Marvin and Laura Home took issue with the
Raisin Committee's reserve requirement. The Homes refused to
reserve any of their own raisins or the raisins that they handled
from other growers.224 The Homes argued that because the
government acquired their property-the raisins-and did not
pay for it,225 the marketing order amounted to a taking withoutjust
compensation. 
226
That challenge rose to the Supreme Court of the United States
and on June 22, 2015 the Court delivered an opinion in Home v.
Department of Agriculture.227 The primary question in Home was
whether a physical appropriation of personal rather than real
property-for example, the government taking possession of the
Home's raisins as opposed to their land-is a constitutional taking
that requires just compensation.228 Although the Court had not
previously addressed this question, an 8-1 majority found that
"[n]othing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or our
precedents, suggests that the rule is any different" between real
and personal property. In short, "The Government has a
categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car,
just as when it takes your home."229
Having determined that the government seizure of the Homes'
property was a taking that required just compensation, the benefit-
offset problem was the next hurdle, which split the justices more
narrowly. 230 The Homes probably received a monetary benefit
from the long-term operation of the supply management program:
by limiting the supply of raisins, the program raised the price and
223. -lorrte, 135 S. Ct. at 2424; see also Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in
California, 7 C.F.R. §§ 989.65-.72 (2015).
224. Harne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424.
225. See id. at 2424. In fact, the Homes were entitled to contingent proceeds from
the Raisin Committee. The Committee would sell the reserve raisins and, after deducting
administrative and other expenses, would distribute any remaining profits to the handlers.
Id.
226. Id. at 2425.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 2425.
229. Id. at 2426. It is interesting that the Court chose to use second person
perspective in this sentence, the only instance of second person in the entire opinion. The
literary tactic was no doubt a rhetorical technique to drive home the personal nature of
property ownership.
230. See id. at 2432.
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increased the Hornes' profit on their crop.231 Should courts
consider a regulatory benefit of this nature when calculating just
compensation? Despite a robust dissent from Justice Breyer, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the Home majority, said no-the
regulatory benefits should not reduce the total compensation-
but the Chief Justice did not adequately explain his reasoning or
announce any new framework for settling future compensation
disputes.
232
Although it was not well expressed in their opinions, the
dispute among the justices seemed to center on whether the
benefits the Hornes may have received were too general and
whether those benefits were certain or speculative. On the one
hand, the Government had earlier imposed a fine on the Homes
that was equal to the market value of the raisins that the Homes
failed to deliver to the Raisin Committee.233 Chief Justice Roberts
and his majority relied on the rule that market value is a fair
measure of compensation, but said little more about the generality
or certainty of the benefit.234 On the other hand, the Government,
and three justices led by Breyer in the dissent, raised the benefit-
offset problem. They argued that the Supreme Court should send
the case back to the lower courts in order to calculate
compensation, adjusting the calculation to account for benefits
that the price support system delivered.235 The dissent, therefore,
suggested that market value alone may not be the right measure of
compensation.
The Government argued, and Justice Breyer in his dissent
agreed, that under the Takings Clause "a property owner is
231. See, e.g., Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California, 7 C.F.R. §§ 989.65-
.72 (2015); Final Free and Reserve Percentages for 2002-03 Crop Natural (Stn-dried)
Seedless and Zante Currant Raisins, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,686, 41,686 (July 15, 2003) ("The
volume regulation percentages are intended to help stabilize raisin supplies and prices,
and strengthen market conditions.").
232. Home, 135 S. Ct. at 2433 ("In any event, this litigation presents no occasion to
consider the broader issues [of calculatingjust compensation].").
233. See id. at 2425.
234. See id. at 2432.
235. Id. at 2428. As it happened, in this case, the Committee never took possession of
the raisins at issue. Id. at 2424. Rather, they fined the Hornes the value of the raisins and
the Homes refused to pay, claiming that the fine would amount to a taking. Id. at 2425.
Therefore, whatever the ultimate compensation, the Government would only pay this
amount if it chose to follow through and acquire the raisins at issue. Had the benefit-offset
applied in this case and the courts determined that the benefit would entirely or vety
dramatically reduce the necessary compensation, then perhaps the ruling would have had
no practical effect on the raisin marketing order.
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entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his
property had not been taken, which is to say that he must be made
whole but is not entitled to more."236 The Court cannot ignore,
therefore, that the reserve requirement exists to reduce raisin
supply and increase raisin prices.237 Of course, the purpose of the
reserve requirement is to benefit an entire class of people, raisin
growers, not any single raisin grower and, in fact, any benefit that
accrues does apply across the industry.238 The broad application of
the benefits leads to the question of special versus general benefits.
This point came up briefly at oral argument, but Professor Michael
McConnell, representing the Hornes, brushed off the issue,
warning the Court: "I don't think we want to get into whether this
would be a special benefit." 239 Given the difficulty of the question,
it is understandable that they would want to avoid it, but the Court
should have addressed this issue directly in order to better justify
its decision and clarify its jurisprudence on the subject.
Despite the warning, Justice Breyer did assess the special versus
general distinction in the Court's precedent. As discussed in
Section IV, supra, that precedent analytically relies on market
value, which is calculated based only on certain benefits that are
certain and quantifiable at the time of the taking, but the
precedent also repeatedly refers to general and specific benefits.
Justice Breyer read that precedent to speak primarily about the
breadth of a benefit, whether the benefit is unique to the property
owner or applies more widely.2 40 Overlooking the issue of whether
the benefit was certain and calculable and reflected in the market
value of the property, Justice Breyer reached the conclusion that
the "Constitution does not distinguish between 'special' benefits,
which specifically affect the property taken, and 'general' benefits,
which have a broader impact."24' He concludes, therefore, that the
lower court should measure the benefit that arises from the
regulatory program (in the form of increased prices for the raisins
236. Id. at 2434 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246,
255 (1934)) (alteration and quotation marks omitted).
237. Id.
238. See Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California, 7 C.F.R. §§ 989.65-.72
(2015); Final Free and Reserve Percentages for 2002-03 Crop Natural (Sun-dried) Seedless
and Zante Currant Raisins, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,686, 41,688-89 (July 15, 2003).
239. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Horne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 14-275), 2015
WL 2473384.
240. Home, 135 S. Ct. at 2434 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
241. Id. at 2435.
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that the Hornes sell on the open market) against the value of the
raisins that the government took from the Hornes.242 If the benefit
exceeds, or exactly matches, the value of the taken property, then
the government need not provide additional compensation.
243
Justice Breyer, however, was wrong in his disposition because he
read the precedent only for its rules on the special-general
distinction and not on the market value analysis. Had he focused
on the market value test that really underlies the Court's previous
decisions, he would have had to consider whether the benefits of
the raisin regulations were certain and calculable and could
therefore be objectively extracted from the market value for the
purposes of offsetting compensation.
In his majority, ChiefJustice Roberts quickly dismissed Breyer's
reasoning. Roberts characterized the Government's argument and
Justice Breyer's more detailed analysis as the "notion that general
regulatory activity . . . can constitute just compensation for a
specific physical taking." 244 But rather than consider that rule, he
called upon the "clear and administrable rule" that 'just
compensation normally is to be measured by 'the market value of
property at the time of the taking."' 245 Justice Breyer's dissent cited
Bauman, McCoy, and Olson, among other cases, for the proposition
that there is no prohibition against considering widespread
benefits. The Chief Justice, in laying out an apparently simple
market value rule, opaquely distinguished these cases, noting that
they "raise complicated questions . . . but they do not create a
generally applicable exception to the usual compensation rule." 
246
However, by distinguishing those cases, ChiefJustice Roberts failed
to recognize their endorsement of the market value rule on which
he explicitly relied, and the certainty and calculability test that he
implicitly applied. The benefits were too uncertain to be
disaggregated from the market value of the remainder raisins and
to offset against the value of the raisins taken. Put differently, the
Chief Justice looked only at the market value of the taken portion
and not the market value of the remainder.
But by endorsing a market value rule for setting
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 2432 (majority opinion).
245. Id. (quoting United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984)).




compensation,247 the Chief Justice did seek to ignore hypothetical
or speculative benefits.248 In particular, Roberts emphasized that if
the Hornes did benefit from the government program, it was from
a far-reaching and long running regulatory program as opposed to
a public works project, such as a dune.249 While his intentions with
this distinction are not clear, it seems likely that the impacts of a
regulatory program, particularly one that has been running for
generations, are harder to determine than those of a public works
project. That is, the impacts of a regulatory program are generally
more speculative and more difficult to calculate.250 Ultimately,
Chief Justice Roberts' conclusion does flow from the Court's
precedent and if read to mimic that precedent they would present
a more appropriate rule for addressing the benefit-offset problem.
Unfortunately, in haste, Roberts distinguished precedent that does
more to support his position, and he certainly failed to articulate
his thinking in a compelling way.
Home presented the opportunity to resolve a lingering issue in
takings jurisprudence: how to deal with the benefit-offset problem.
The question was barely briefed,25' not forcefully presented at oral
argument,252 and though Justice Breyer chose to make it the
centerpiece of his threejustice dissent, Chief Justice Roberts gave
it only superficial treatment. With the increasing impacts of
climate change and the growing efforts to adapt to them, this
failure makes it more difficult for local governments and lower
courts to effectively design resilience projects that involve partial
takings of private property.
247. See id. ("The Court has repeatedly held thatjust compensation normally is to be
measured by 'the market value of the property at the time of the taking."' (quoting 50
Acres o/ Land, 469 U.S. at 29)).
248. See id. ("[T]he Government cites no support for its hypothetical-based
approach.").
249. Id. ("[T]he Government cites no support for . . . its notion that general
regulatory activity such as enforcement of quality standards can constitute just
compensation for a specific physical taking.").
250. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 247 (1985).
251. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer,J. dissenting).
252. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Hmne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 14-
275), 2015 WL 2473384.
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VII. ARTICULATING A FAIR-MARKET VALUE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
BENEFIT-OFFSET PROBLEM
When the United States Supreme Court next has the
opportunity to consider the benefit-offset problem, it should avoid
its errors in Home and adopt an explicit and just rule. This does
not require a reinvention of their doctrine. The Court has applied
consistent reasoning when dealing with the benefit-offset problem,
but has not articulated a rule in a sufficiently transparent and
powerful way. In New Jersey, however, Karan very clearly
announced a fair market value rule: when there is a partial taking,
the courts will consider both unique and widespread benefits to
the remaining property as long as those benefits are certain and
calculable enough to have an impact on the price a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller for the remaining property.253 Though it
would not be a departure from its current jurisprudence, the
United States Supreme Court has failed to explicitly adopt this
same rule, and Chief Justice Roberts declined the opportunity in
Home. The Court's ongoing failure to clearly outline a fair-market-
based benefit-offset rule may have led to the Chief Justice's correct
conclusions but insufficient analysis in Home. When properly
articulated, the rule aligns with Roberts' conclusion while also
paralleling the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning and
conclusion in Karan, despite the fact that the cases reach opposite
conclusions with respect to "offsetting" the respective benefits.
Understanding the lessons of Karan provides the bulk of the
analysis needed for a new articulation of the fair market value rule
in the Supreme Court. This Section highlights those lessons,
fleshes out a fuller analysis, and rectifies the divergent conclusions
of Karan.
A. Lessons from Karan
The rule and rationale in Karan are, for all practical purposes,
perfect reflections of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and
since the Supreme Court has yet to clearly articulate the current
lessons of its cases, Karan is an excellent guide.
The Karan court provided a good assessment of the rationale
for disposing of the special-general distinction in New Jersey and
relying instead on fair market value, which is central to the
253. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 540 (N.J. 2013).
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Supreme Court's precedent.254 In fact, the Karan court had to deal
with equally confusing and more explicitly contradictory New
Jersey case law255 than the Supreme Court will have to address in its
own precedent,256 should it take an opportunity to clearly
announce a cohesive rule for the benefit-offset problem.
In disposing of the special-general distinction, Karan reasoned:
"the terms special and general benefits do more to obscure than
illuminate the basic principles governing the computation of just
compensation in eminent domain cases."257 The court continued,
"the problem with the term 'general benefits' is that it may mean
different things to different courts. To some courts the term
'general benefits' is a surrogate for speculative or conjectural
benefits."258 Indeed, Karan explained fully that courts must avoid
speculative and conjectural benefits, but that is distinct from
broadly applicable or widespread benefits, which courts may
consider but are also sometimes subsumed by the definition of
"general benefits."259
To avoid speculation and conjecture, and to move away from
the special-general distinction, Karan announced the controlling
rule as follows: "The fair-market considerations that inform
computing just compensation in partial-takings cases should be no
different than in total-takings cases. They are the considerations
that a willing buyer and a willing seller would weigh in coming to
an agreement on the property's value at the time of the taking." 260
Further:
just compensation should be based on non-conjectural and
quantifiable benefits that are capable of reasonable calculation at the
time of the taking. Speculative benefits projected into the
indefinite future should not be considered. Benefits that both a
willing buyer and willing seller would agree enhance the value of
the property should be considered in determining just
compensation, whether those benefits are categorized as special
or general.
261
254. Id. at 538.
255. See id. at 535-540.
256. See supra Section IV.




261. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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To highlight the need for non-conjectural benefits, Karan
focused on several clearly speculative arguments. For example, the
rapid growth of railroads in the nineteenth century led to many
partial takings in which railroad companies utilized portions of
private property for track and sought to minimize their payments
for damages to the remainder.262 Railroads minimized their
obligation to compensate for the initial taking by insisting that the
presence of tracks would increase population and commerce,
making the remaining property more valuable.263  Courts
responded to this rampant injustice by developing the idea of
general benefits, initially curbing the railroads' free pass based on
the idea that the population and commercial benefits to which the
railroads pointed were widespread, applying to the entire
community.264 But in hindsight, a more accurate interpretation of
the relevant cases is that the impacts of new population and new
commerce were speculative and there was no way to calculate the
present value of a non-quantifiable increase in population or
commercial activity. 265 As the Karan court explained, earlier courts
"expected that benefits emanating from a public project that
enhanced the value of the remainder property in a partial-takings
case-benefits that were non-speculative and reasonably calculable
at the time of the taking-would be weighed in fixing an award of
just compensation." 
266
Karan added more clarity to the early concerns about uncertain
benefits by explaining that a benefit is conjectural if it might arise
"in the indefinite future."26 7 A benefit is unquantifiable if it is "so
uncertain in character as to be incapable of present estimation." 
268
In contrast, what the court must look for is benefits that are
"capable of present estimation"269 (i.e., reasonably certain),
"capable of ... reasonable computation"270 (i.e., calculable), and
"actual benefit"271 (i.e., non-speculative), and an "enhancement in





267. Id. at 537.
268. Id. (quoting Mangles v. Hudson Cry. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 25 A. 322, 323
(N.J. 1892)).
269. Id. at 538 (quoting Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 585 (1897)).
270. Id. (quoting Bauman, 167 U.S. at 585).
271. Id. (citing McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918)).
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market value" 272 (i.e., real and measureable).
The Supreme Court's decisions already represent a nearly
identical framework, though it has not yet attempted to lay out
that framework in one systemized analysis. Below is an effort to do
SO.
B. A Fair-Market-Value-Based Approach to the Benefit-Offset Problem
This Article argues for the following approach to the benefit-
offset problem: when a government regulatory program or public
works project partially takes private property and creates a benefit
to the remaining property, the owner is entitled to compensation
that reflects certain and calculable increases in the market value of
the remainder.27 3 A court need not try to distinguish between
special and general benefits insofar as those terms relate to the
scope of the benefits. Across the board, courts should jettison
these terms, which have never been well articulated and are
frequently confused and misused, treated as controlling the
outcome when they are merely descriptors, and inconsistent
descriptors at that. Rather than leaning on an antiquated and
unreliable distinction around the scope of benefits, the court need
only determine if the benefits are reasonably certain and capable
of present calculation, and therefore influence the market value of
the remainder. If the benefits are reasonably certain and capable
of present calculation; if they do not require speculation,
qualitative judgments, or waiting for some prospective benefit to
actually arise so that it can be calculated; and if they increase the
fair market value of the remaining property; then the court can
subtract that from the compensation for the part taken.
This rule is easily applicable in practice when the benefits are
certain and quantifiable. If a government takes a sliver of land to
create a park, which will reduce the size of a property but will also
give it access to a new park, assessors will determine the fair market
value of the property based on, for example, its acreage and its
proximity to the park. The assessors will look to recent sales of
similar property in the area. The shrinking lot size, when
considered alone, will certainly decrease the property value, while
272. Id. (citing McCoy, 247 U.S. at 366).
273. E.g., Home v. Dep't. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015) (quoting United
States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984)) ("The Court has repeatedly held that
just compensation normally is to be measured by 'the market value of the property at the
time of the taking.").
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the new park will likely increase the value. Based on their
calculations, the assessors will be able to determine if the final fair
market value of the property is higher or lower based on the
government project. The benefit of the park is not speculative:
there is no question that the park now exists and that the public,
including the property owner, can access and use it. The benefit of
this park is calculable if assessors can rely on sales of other homes
in similar situations. This is not a rare situation. It is not a vague
benefit but is instead easily identifiable when searching for
comparable properties. If the park has increased the fair market
value of the remainder, if a willing buyer would now pay a willing
seller more than she would have before the park existed, then the
government has not damaged the remaining property and the
court can identify the margin of increase to offset the
compensation. If the value of the remainder has decreased from its
value prior to the park's creation, the court must order
compensation equal to the decrease in fair market value, in
addition to compensation for the part taken. 
274
The rule is also easily applicable when the benefits are
speculative. If the benefits are speculative and not calculable, the
court should instruct the assessors or fact finders to ignore those
benefits, and therefore not factor those benefits into
compensation. By way of example, the government may flood a
portion of property to build a reservoir.275 In so doing the
government is taking the flooded portion of property. However,
this process may also make the contours of the geography more
appropriate for building a power plant. There is an obvious benefit
here. Suppose, however, that the flooded land belongs to a
number of landowners and these landowners would have to agree
to cooperatively develop the power plant.276 While there is still a
274. Quantitatively, an example: A sliver of land taken for a park is worth $1,000 and
that becomes the baseline for compensation for the land actually taken. If assessors
determine that proximity to the park will not increase the property value, then just
compensation is $1,000. If the proximity will increase the property value by $250, then just
compensation is $750 (the baseline of $1,000 less the increase in fair market value of
$250). If the proximity raises the property value by $5,000, then there is no compensation
because the benefit outweighs the total damage. If the remainder is damaged and is now
worth $5,000 less, then compensation is $6,000, the market value of the land taken plus
damage to the remainder's market value.
275. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
276. See id. at 248 (considering a taking that left properties partially flooded but
better suited for power generation should the various property owners agree to
cooperatively develop power facilitates).
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possible benefit here, it relies on uncertainty about the
cooperation of the landowners. They might not agree to pool their
land. A court would have to speculate about the ultimate use of the
land. In the same vein, calculating the value of such a speculative
benefit poses a problem. Perhaps some neighbors will agree and
others will not, or they will agree to allow a small facility that
provides a small benefit, but not the maximum potential benefit.
This uncertainty makes the potential benefit incalculable at the
time of the taking. The precedent clearly objects to considering
this sort of contingent benefit.
C. Reevaluating Home and Karan
In Home, Justice Breyer suggested that the Court should
speculate on differing values to account for the uncertain benefits
of the ongoing raisin reserve program.277 Chief Justice Roberts
refused and the Court approved of compensation at the actual and
calculable market value of the taken raisins.278 In Karan, the
property owners argued that the court should speculate on
differing values to discount for the storm-protection benefits.279
The New Jersey Supreme Court refused because the benefits were
certain and calculable enough to influence the fair market value
and offset compensation.280 Perhaps the United States Supreme
Court refused to speculate on the prevailing market value in Home
because the exact benefits of the raisin-marketing program were
uncertain and incalculable.
The single rule so far described in this Article-that
compensation is adjusted based on the market value of a
remainder, only as influenced by certain and presently calculable
benefits-explains the opposite rulings in Karan and Home. In
Karan the storm-protection benefits were reasonably certain and
were easily calculable. The fact that the government dune project
would ultimately save the Karans' home was a natural
277. See Home, 135 S. Ct. at 2436 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In my view, however, the
relevant precedent indicates that the Takings Clause requires compensation in an amount
equal to the value of the reserve raisins adjusted to account for the benefits received.").
278. The idea of fair market value may seem inappropriate in the context of such a
highly regulated market. Nevertheless, the value of the Hornes' raisins was set at a level
that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller. That amount is highly influenced by the
government-managed supply program, but the individual transactions are not compelled
and the prices are merely influenced by the program, not set thereunder.
279. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 528 (N.J. 2013).
280. Id. at 544.
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consideration in a fair market assessment of the home, likely
causing the value of their home to increase after the dune
project,281 and therefore, under both New Jersey and Federal
doctrine, the Karans were entitled only to any compensation for
any net loss.
Appraisal is a reasonably objective mechanism for determining
property value, but it is not without some subjective aspects. Two
appraisers served as experts in Karan.28 2 Both experts agreed on
the initial, pre-taking value of the Karans' property and both
agreed that they could ascertain fair market value by comparing
the Karans' property to other similar properties on the Jersey
Shore that were recently valued or sold.283 A trial court judge,
however, instructed both appraisers to ignore storm-protection
related benefits in their assessments, forcing both experts to
deviate from the actual market value of the property.2 4 Ignoring
the benefits inserted fiction into the process. As the engineering
experts testified, prior to the dune construction, there was a 56%
chance that a storm would destroy the Karans' home in the next
thirty years.285 After the dune construction, the house would
withstand storms for 200 years or more.
28 6
One should not allow this risk calculation to confuse the
certainty of the market benefits. It is not the underlying risk
reduction (which is indeed speculative) that is the critical
calculation. Rather, it is the public or prospective buyer's
knowledge of storm protection that boosts the fair market value.
Appraisals can determine whether a willing buyer would pay more
for a property that has significant storm protection than for a
property without such protections. Indeed, the benefits of storm
protection apply broadly to the entire neighborhood, even to all of
Long Beach Island or the New Jersey coast.287 However, that does
not make their impact on fair market value any less certain or
quantifiable. Under this Article's proposed rule, the court will
allow consideration of appraisals that take into account only
certain and calculable benefits. While different experts may reach
281. Id. at 541.
282. Id. at 530.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 529.
286. Id.
287. See id. at 541-42.
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different conclusions as to value, it is up to the fact finder to
determine which appraiser's conclusions are most sound.
In Home, Chief Justice Roberts declined to make any special
adjustments or to speculate about what fair market value might be
in the absence of the raisin-marketing program.288 Roberts
followed the Court's precedent by recognizing that compensation
should be set at the current market value of the Hornes' raisins,
which included the benefits of the regulatory program, and which
the Government had already calculated as part of its enforcement
effort.289 In extensive administrative hearings, a Department of
Agriculture Judicial Officer calculated the market value of the
Hornes' raisins that the Hornes failed to reserve.290 Calculating this
price simply involved multiplying the tonnage of raisins that the
Hornes' should have turned over to the Raisin Administrative
Committee by the average price per 'ton of raisins in the relevant
crop year.29' This number was an established market value that did
not rely on speculation, but on actual prices, and was readily
calculable.
The Chief Justice dismissed Justice Breyer's alternative.292
Justice Breyer read the Court's precedent and understood that
neither the cases nor the Constitution recognize a distinction
between general and special benefits.2 93 Justice Breyer also gleaned
that it is appropriate to offset benefits.294 Where Justice Breyer fell
short was in his repeated claim that precedent dictated offsetting
"any enhancement" or "any benefit."295 In fact, the precedent
only allows offsetting certain, non-speculative, calculable benefits.
Breyer cited the correct precedent in his dissent (Bauman, McCoy,
and Olson, among other cases), but failed to address the repeated
admonitions against speculation. Chief Justice Roberts read each
of the cases without appreciating that most of them actually
support the proposition that market value is the measure of
compensation and that speculative benefits are not valid
considerations.296 Roberts therefore distinguished cases that
288. Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2015).
289. Id.
290. Horne v. U.S. Dep't ofAgric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1135 n.6 (9th Cir. 2014).
291. Home v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 2009 WL 4895362, at *19 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
292. llhfne, 135 S. Ct. at 2432-33.
293. Id. at 2434 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 2432 (majority opinion).
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supported his conclusions.297
The disposition in Home for which Justice Breyer advocated, in
addition to being a departure from precedent, would have
required the Court to speculate about the impacts of the
generations-old regulatory program, evaluate retrospectively how
that program impacted prices over more than a half-century, and
determine how that long-term impact influenced contemporary
prices.298 This method would have resulted in lower compensation
(or possibly no compensation) but it would have placed more
burden on the Court and injected greater uncertainty and
speculation into the process. More importantly, it would have been
contrary to all the Court's earlier decisions on this subject.
299
There are only two possible distinctions in Home that might
have led to a different result. First, all of the earlier cases
considered real property30  while Home dealt with personal
property.30 1 Of course, as Justice Breyer pointed out, Home's
primary holding assured that the takings doctrine should not apply
differently to personal and real property. 302
The other possible distinction between Home and prior cases
on the benefit-offset problem is that Home dealt with a regulatory
program as opposed to a public works project.303 There does not
appear to be Supreme Court precedent providing rules for
assessing how a comprehensive regulatory program that effects a
297. Id.
298. See id. at 2435-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
299. See supra Section IV, analyzing the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the benefit-
offset problem.
300. There is one notable exception to this statement. In United States v. Cots, the
Court did address the case of personal property-a tugboat-condemned by the War
Shipping Administration for the effort in World War II. 337 U.S. 325, 327 (1949). The fact
that the Court was dealing with personal property rather than real property did not arise
as an issue. See id. What is interesting about this case is that it presents perhaps the only
example where the Court did set off what might otherwise have been a speculative benefit.
Id. at 333. The entire market for tugs was inflated by a government buying and
condemnation program, and the Court decided that it could offset the inflation attributed
specifically to the government program. Id. at 328. This case is distinguishable on at least
two grounds. First, it was clearly a total, not partial, taking of the tug and therefore the
Court looked to precedent for considering how the operation of a program might
influence the market before the final transfer of property. Id. at 332. Second, this case
involved a temporaly emergency program, the impact of which is more capable of
calculation and less speculative than an on-going, decades-old, regulatory scheme. See id. at
333-34.
301. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424.
302. Id. at 2436 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (citing majority opinion at 2433).
303. Id. at 2424 (majority opinion).
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taking of property impacts the market value of that property or its
remainder. The question of whether the impacts of the regulatory
scheme are sufficiently certain and calculable to impact market
value seems to be largely a factual inquiry.
In Richard Epstein's seminal (if not entirely reasonable) book
on takings, he gives some consideration to the effects of
comprehensive regulations in comparison to more traditional
public-project takings.304 Comprehensive government regulations,
he argues, always create more uncertainty than do projects that
impact one or several specific properties.3 5 It should come as no
surprise that calculating the benefits of a regulatory program is
more challenging than calculating the benefits of a public works
project because regulatory benefits come "in the form of public
goods, which are notoriously difficult to value." 306 "It is," writes
Epstein, "more difficult to calculate the wealth and distributional
effects of comprehensive government regulations."' 307 This
reasoning, that regulations provide less calculable benefits than
public works, is an indication that courts generally may not offset
regulatory benefits.
The raisin supply management program may actually be more
easily calculable than farther reaching regulatory programs. The
raisin reserves, for example, apply only to a limited number of
citizens-those handling California raisins.30 8 The speculation and
incalculability here arise because there is no obvious fair market
value in the absence of the supply management program. The
program has operated for over 60 years and has therefore
influenced market prices over that entire timespan.3 9 It is hard to
argue the benefits that supply management provides to raisin
handlers, as the program limits supply in order to raise prices, but
the quantity of benefit is not capable of present calculation. "The
sheer number of parties involved [in a regulatory program as
opposed to public works project] indicates that the problems of
error and measurement, far from being the tail that wags the dog,
becomes, for all purposes, the dog itself." 
310
304. See EPSTEIN, supra note 250, at 200-47.
305. Id. at 274.
306. Id. at 200.
307. Id. at 274.
308. SeeHorne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 2009 WL 4895362, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
309. See id.
310. EPSTEIN, supra note 250, at 200.
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Perhaps if a raisin handler objected at the outset of the
program, or shortly after its inception, a comparison of the
prevailing market prices and the pre-regulation prices would allow
for more certain calculations of the benefits the program. That is
not the case in Home, validating Chief Justice Roberts'
unwillingness to speculate.
D. Summarizing the Benefit-Offset Doctrine
The Chief Justice may not want courts to speculate about the
benefits of regulatory programs, but his poorly articulated
justification for the compensation. ruling in Home forces courts
and local government decision makers to speculate about the
exact contours of the benefit-offset rule. The job of articulation is
therefore left to academics, at least for the time being. The
following is an attempt to summarize the rules that govern the
benefit-offset problem.
Courts should rely on fair market value and refrain from
adjusting compensation based on speculative or uncertain factors.
Courts should discard the misleading dichotomy of special and
general benefits and should instead consider whether benefits are
reasonably certain and capable of present estimation. Courts
should not endeavor to perform subjective and speculative
adjustments based on potential but uncertain benefits that are not
presently calculable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The 2015 storm season spared the New Jersey coast from
anything approaching the scale of Hurricane Sandy.31' But major
flooding in Charleston, South Carolina312 is a reminder of how
critical coastal adaptation projects are all along the coasts. A result
of Hurricane Joaquin, Charleston saw "days of relentless,
saturating rains.' ' 31 3 "Vehicles were submerged, dams were pushed
311. See, e.g., Gayathri Vaidyanathan & Benjamin Hulac, tlurricane.oaquin Helps Fuel
Record Rains, Damaging Floods, SCI. AM. (Oct. 5, 2015), available at
http://ww.scientificamerican.com/article/hurricanejoaquin-helps-ftiel-reco,-d-rains-
damaging-floods/.
312. Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, Flooding Ciipples South Carolina Where Someo Areas






to their limits, electricity was cut off to thousands and emergency
officials staged hundreds of swift-water rescues."31 4 At least 15
people were killed.
315
Measurements in Charleston Harbor show an increase in sea
levels since the 1920s, demonstrating that "today's floods are
tomorrow's high tides."3 16 Prior to the fall 2015 flooding,
Charleston had taken some steps to account for this trajectory, but
they were marginal and insufficient. For example, the City has
installed backflow preventers in drainage systems around two
downtown streets, and has upgraded one of its stormwater pumps
stations.3 7 Charleston will have to do more.
Charleston is less than 15 miles from Isle of Palms, South
Carolina318 where David Lucas owned a property that was central
to another Fifth Amendment takings controversy more than two
decades ago.319 Charleston's future resilience efforts might spark
similar legal objections and doctrinal opportunities, if not in
Charleston, South Carolina, then perhaps in NewJersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, or any other vulnerable jurisdiction.
Regardless, there will be more resilience projects, there will be
interference with private property, there will be legal challenges,
and the United States Supreme Court will have its opportunity to
revisit the benefit-offset problem.
When that time comes, the Court should clearly and directly
resolve three issues. First, the Court must discharge the special-
general benefits distinction. That distinction has added only
confusion and subjectivity and has not served as an administrable
benchmark for deciding when to offset a benefit against
compensation. Second, the Court should reiterate that fair market
value is the basis for determining just compensation. When the
314. Id.
315. Holly Yan and Ray Sanchez, South Carolina looding: Dans Breached, More Trouble
Ahead, CNN (Oct. 7, 2015, 12:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/1O/06/us/south-
carolina-flooding/.
316. Minimizing the Inpacts of Coastal Flooding Helps City Prepare for Sea Level Rise, NAT'L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://toolkit.climate.gov/taking-action/minimizing-
impacts-coastal-flooding-helps-city-prepare-sea-evel-rise (last modified Nov. 13, 2015, 11:31
AM).
317. Id.
318. lEg., Isle of Palnts: Irresistible Enjyment, CHARLESTON AREA CONVENTION &
VISITORS BuREAu, http://www.charlestoncvb.coin/beaches/isle-of-palms/ (last visited Oct.
16, 2015).
319. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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government partially takes private property, the government owes
the owner for the taken portion (measured by its market value)
and for any damage to the remainder (based on a decrease in its
market value). But if certain and calculable benefits increase the
market value of the remainder, then compensation for the part
taken should decrease by the certain and calculable increase to the
market value of the remainder. Third, and finally, the Court
should elaborate its prior holdings that benefits resulting from a
public project or regulation, whether widespread or narrow, may
be considered as part of a fair market assessment and offset against
compensation only if they are certain, non-speculative, and
presently calculable. That is, only if they are the sort of benefits
that a willing buyer and willing seller would consider in reaching a
price on the open market.
All of these principles are established in the Court's case law,
but they have not been fully drawn together in an articulate rule.
Home reached the same compensation conclusion that it would
have under these rules, but without this express reasoning. Karan,
and this Article, should provide the fodder for finally settling the
benefit-offset problem.
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